Sexual Orientation and the Pitfalls of the “Born This Way” Debate: Reading Edward Stein

The immutability of sexual orientation has long been a topic of debate in political, academic, and legal spheres. Advocates of gay rights have often centered their positions on the “born that way” and “not a choice” arguments. The basic claim of these arguments roughly follows the same form: “If same-sex sexual attractions were inborn or unchangeable, then it would be wrong to discriminate against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LBG people), it would be wrong to criminalize same-sex sexual activities, and wrong to withhold state-sanctioned legal recognition for same-sex relationships” (Stein, 1999). While these arguments ostensibly make a clear-cut case for the immutability of sexual orientation, the nuances of this perspective have philosophical and practical implications for justice and equality.

The dichotomy between nature vs nurture has a long history in a plethora of fields, such as psychology, biology, behavioral genetics, psychiatry, sociology, and education. The natalist perspective holds that sexual orientations are inborn and innate, while the environmentalist position claims that sexual orientation is a result of environmental factors. However, in questions of human development and behavior, the answer is rarely black and white. Most modern psychologists view the argument of nature vs nurture as outdated, holding that both genetics and environment are inextricably linked and “all human behaviors are the result of both” (Stein, 1999).

The constructivist approach, born from the work of Michel Foucault, conflicts with the essentialism of the scientific approach, emphasizing history and culture in the construction of contemporary categories of sexual orientation. Foucault argued that sexual orientation is historically specific and held that institutions not only repress sexuality but construct categories, norms, and identities around it (Foucault, 1978).

To understand the nuances of the essentialist argument more completely, we must momentarily depart here to an exploration of the notion of natural kinds. “A natural kind is a grouping of entities that plays a central role in the correct scientific laws and explanations” (Stein, 1999). That is to say, a natural kind reflects the structure of the natural world, independent of human conceptions. Classic examples include compounds and elements in chemistry, the force of gravity in physics, and species in biology. In humans, blood type is an example of a natural kind insofar as it plays a role in who can receive and donate blood.

However, the notion of natural kinds remains a philosophically debated concept that hinges on limits of objectivity and human subjectivity. The debate about sexual orientation comes down to the distinction of natural kinds. In other words, does sexual orientation function according to scientific laws? The essentialist view argues the affirmative, while the constructivist view argues the negative. Again, however, the answer is not so clear cut: “Essentalism could still be true even if environmentalism is true” (Stein, 1999). The concept of nature vs nurture, as well as human choice and agency, plays a role here. Even if biological factors play a role in sexual orientation, an individual must choose to engage in sexual behaviors or be openly gay–choices that are strongly influenced by sociocultural norms and laws. The point here is that “even if sexual orientations are innate or not chosen, much of what is ethically relevant about being an LGB person is not innate and not determined” (Stein, 1999). The implication here cannot be understated. Even if the essentialist argument for the immutability of sexual orientation is accepted, one could also accept that LGBTQ+ individuals can be treated differently based on their choices. This sets the basis for many conservative religious attitudes regarding homosexuality. The position that homosexuality itself is not a sin, but rather the decision to act upon it, is in this regard consistent with the “born this way” argument and allows for discrimination based on the premise of “choice.”

We come to see then that biologically based claims for homosexuality do not necessarily guarantee positive results for LGBTQ+ people. On the contrary, the “born this way” argument utilized by Hirschfield in the 20th century in an attempt to gain legal recognition for homosexual people inadvertently contributed to persecution by stigmatizing homosexual individuals as biologically defective. As in issues with race and developmental disability, “believing that a characteristic is a natural human kind does not in any way guarantee that people will view this characteristic in a positive light” (Stein, 1999). The fraught relationship between science and LGBTQ+ politics is exemplified in the history of American psychiatry. During the era of LGBTQ+ rights in the United States, many activists embraced psychiatry in the hopes that it would legitimize LGB people, however, the American Psychiatric Association’s classification of homosexuality as abnormal pathology ultimately contributed to the stigmatization of homosexuality and undermined the practical intention behind the “born this way” argument. One consequence of the deficiency perspective is the increased likelihood that, hypothetically, reproductive technologies could be used to produce heterosexual children through orientation-selection procedures like prenatal screening, which would only serve to further engender and perpetuate negative attitudes about LGBTQ+ people.

The immutability of sexual orientation has been central in historical legal battles over same-sex rights and protections. In the Andersen v. King County case (138 P.3d 963 [Wash. 2006], the Washington Supreme Court ruled: “To qualify as a suspect class for purposes of an equal protection analysis ... the characteristic defining the class [must be] an obvious, immutable trait. . . . The plaintiffs do not cite [any] authority ... in support of the conclusion that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. . . . [Plaintiffs must make a showing of immutability, and they have not (974).” The court argued that without established immutability, heightened scrutability regarding legal protections for same-sex couples was unwarranted. In response, advocates argued for a “soft” interpretation of immutability, saying “"[b]ecause sexual orientation is such an essential component of personhood, even if there is some possibility that a person's sexual preference can be altered, it would be wholly unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so” (Stein, 1999). The Connecticut Supreme Court eventually upheld this interpretation.

Because of the risks associated with the essentialist “born this way” argument, advocates for LGBTQ+ rights have argued that trying to achieve legal rights through empirical claims is a tricky and futile endeavor. Stein (1999) argues that a better strategy is to “talk directly about justice, fairness, and equality for LGBTQ+ people than to try to recast such questions as scientific, psychological, or metaphysical questions.”

REFERENCES

Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).

Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality: Volume 1: An introduction (R. Hurley, Trans.). Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1976)

Stein, E. (1999). Sexual orientations, rights, and the body: Immutability, essentialism, and nativism. Social Research, 66(2), 415–445.